The interplay between parties and media in putting EU issues on the agenda by Maier, Michaela et al.
Article 
The Interplay between Parties and Media in Putting EU-Issues on the Agenda. 
A temporal pattern analysis of the 2014 European Parliamentary  
election campaigns in Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom 
 
Abstract  
We investigate the interplay between party communication and media coverage in putting EU-issues on the 
agenda during the 2014 European Parliamentary election campaigns in Austria, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom. A temporal pattern analysis focuses on the dynamic perspective of media-parties’ interactions 
based on a quantitative content analysis of (a) the press releases published by parties and (b) the coverage of 
two leading newspapers per country 12 weeks prior to the elections. We find that most public discourses are 
started by the media; however, political parties especially in Austria are also quite successful in initiating 
discussions about EU issues. Interestingly, once an issue has been placed on the agenda, only few parties take 
the chance of their issue ownership as response to the media agenda. On the other side, media react to 
publications of all party types, even radical parties.  
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Introduction 
For a long time, researchers agreed that in public discourse Europe was a side- or even a non-issue (e.g. De 
Vreese et al., 2007). However, in 2014 the traditional second-order character of European Parliamentary 
elections was challenged: Never before has the European integration project been as contested on side of the 
citizens (e.g. Hurrelmann et al., 2015). We have seen new Eurosceptic parties emerging and segments of 
traditional parties becoming more critical about EU integration (e.g. Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2011). EU 
topics have become relevant news items lately (e.g. Kleinnijenhuis and Van Atteveldt, 2016). And finally, by 
introducing so called lead candidates for the President of the European Commission (e.g. Maier et al., 2017), 
the Europarties themselves expressed their hope that ‘This time [it would be] different’  (e.g. Van der Brug et 
al., 2016). In the light of these significant changes, our paper aims to understand how political parties and 
mass media interact in setting the emerging European campaign agenda. Thereby, our analytical approach 
allows the temporal analysis of issue-specific reciprocal media-party interactions which has urgently been 
called for (e.g. Meijers and Rauh, 2016; Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011). The question who triggers European 
debates that are taken up by other societal actors has not been answered yet, although the evolution of a 
European public sphere has always been regarded as significant for the project of European integration (e.g. 
De Vreese, 2003). Numerous publications in the tradition of agenda-setting research come to the conclusion 
that mass media have a major impact on the political agenda (for a recent summary see, e.g. Thesen, 2013). 
However, other findings suggest that media depend on political parties to put issues on the agenda (e.g. 
Hopmann et al., 2012). And especially European issues seem to require such input on side of the national 
parties as their remoteness and facelessness in general has only little news value for the media (e.g. Adam, 
2007; Jalali and Silva, 2011). During the last years, research has made great progress in explaining the 
strategic EU-related communication efforts of different party types (e.g. Hobolt and De Vries, 2015; Meijers, 
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2015; Van deWardt et al., 2014). However, it’s likewise important to analyse the interactions between 
political parties and mass media to attain a full picture of who pushes and who impedes the development of a 
Europeanised public sphere and how such debates either get momentum as they get picked up by other actors 
or drain away – a process that we label agenda-dynamics. Therefore, our two guiding research questions are: 
 
1. Who is successful in setting debates about Europe on the agenda that are picked up by other players?  
2. Which factors – on side of the parties and the media – impact agenda dynamics?  
 
To answer these research questions, we analyse party-media-interactions during the 2014 EP election 
campaigns in Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom. We thereby rely on temporal pattern (T-pattern) 
analysis (Magnusson, 2000) of parties’ press releases and newspaper articles to study interactions between 
both groups of players in detail. This method offers a promising analytical alternative to the field as it detects 
typical issue-specific patterns in the interactions between an (theoretically) unlimited number of actors 
allowing to study not only who is first to set a topic on the agenda, but also how media and party players 
interact with each other afterwards.  
In the following, we will first summarise the state of research regarding interactions of political parties and 
media in (EU) agenda-setting and derive hypotheses and more fine-grained research questions. We will then 
explain case selection,  data collection, coding and introduce T-pattern analysis before presenting findings and 
end with a summary and discussion. 
Theory and hypotheses 
The agenda-setting approach serves as the theoretical background for our study as its dynamic aspect allows 
us to focus on the temporal interplay between agendas, which is the key focus of this study.  
Party Politics 0(0) 
  
Agenda-setting – Who leads the public discourse on EU integration?  
Summarising the state of research, the question who leads whom in shaping the political discourse, i.e. who is 
successful in putting issues on the agenda which get picked up by other players, in general and with regards to 
European issues specifically cannot be easily answered. Even though the reciprocal, mutually dependent 
relationship between media (needing politicians as sources of political information) and politicians (relying on 
media as channels to reach their voters) is indisputable, there has been a most lively academic discussion 
regarding who plays the dominant role in setting the agenda (for an overview, see e.g. Walgrave and Van 
Aelst, 2006). While a number of studies finds bi-directional relationships (e.g. Vliegenthart and Montes, 2014 
for Spain), other authors come to the conclusion that empirical evidence points to a stronger relevance of the 
mass media agenda for political parties than vice versa (for summaries, see Thesen, 2013; Van Aelst and 
Walgrave, 2011; Vesa et al., 2015). However, most authors agree that the political agenda-setting power of 
media is contingent and varies, e.g. depending on the type of discourse (stronger for symbolic discourses), 
issue (e.g. stronger for foreign policy), medium (stronger for newspapers), and time period (stronger in non-
campaign times; e.g. Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). These examples already suggest that the influence of 
media on party agendas might be especially strong in cases that suit a typical media logic, increasing the news 
value of political issues and at the same time the incentive for political players to meet the media’s criterions. 
In this sense, media-party agenda-setting has recently also been connected to the phenomenon of 
mediatisation (e.g. Meijers & Rauh, 2016; Thesen, 2013; also see Strömbäck, 2008). In addition, current 
research shows that media’s attention to European issues has been growing during the last EP election 
campaigns (e.g. Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Kleinnijenhuis and Van Atteveldt, 2016), increasing the 
newsworthiness of the former second-order event (e.g. De Vreese, 2007). Summarizing these findings 
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regarding general media-party interactions and transferring these to the context of EP elections, we claim in 
our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: During the 2014 EP campaigns, media are most successful in initiating debates that are picked 
up by others.   
 
However on the other side, empirical evidence exists that strategic communication of political actors, e.g. 
publishing press-releases, can also influence the media agenda (e.g. Froehlich & Rüdiger, 2006; Vliegenthart 
and Montes, 2014). Such agenda-building effects have been shown to be especially strong in times of 
elections (e.g. Brandenburg, 2002; Hopmann et al., 2012; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006), when it must be a 
major goal for parties to communicate positions to the electorate and for specific issues. Especially for EU-
related topics, media salience depends on political actors who actively communicate about Europe, give the 
EU a face, and attach relevance to it (Adam, 2007; Jalali and Silva, 2011; Schuck et al., 2011). Regarding 
parties’ willingness to engage in public discourse about the EU, current research shows that a growing 
number of political parties seems to have an incentive to become active. For a long time, most mainstream 
parties resisted politicizing EU issues (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2008), while challenger parties engaged in the 
role as issue entrepreneurs (e.g. De Vries and Hobolt, 2012) or aimed at exploiting wedge issues of 
mainstream parties (Van de Wardt et al., 2014). However, since the 2009 EP elections, there is evidence that 
mainstream parties also put EU issues on the agenda, either: in the sense of evasion, if they are in a weak 
position on the national level (Adam and Maier, 2016; Adam et al., 2016); or in the sense of contagion, if the 
electoral success of challenger parties forces them to also take a stance on EU issues (Meijers, 2015). 
Summarising both aspects – media’s dependency on parties’ EU-communication and parties’ increased 
willingness to get involved – it also seems justified to propose a counter-hypothesis  
Hypothesis 1b: During the 2014 EP campaigns, political parties are most successful in initiating debates 
that are picked up by others.   
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Agenda dynamics I – Under which conditions do parties react to the media agenda? 
Beyond the question who initially puts an issue on the agenda,the further interplay between parties and media 
has to be examined (for this demand see e.g. Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2011). From the perspective of parties, 
the question is, when do they decide to react if media have put EU issues on the agenda? Refining the notion 
of media superiority over political party agendas, several authors have called to consider the strategic 
component of parties’ communication behaviour. For example, Van der Pas (2014: 43-44) claims that 
‘political actors have a choice whether to react or not to what the media are covering, and often consider this 
carefully’. The current state of research offers a multitude of factors, which could potentially explain parties’ 
engagement in media-set public discourse about EU issues (e.g. Adam and Maier, 2016). In this analysis, we 
focus on the two factors, which have received most attention so far when analysing parties’ willingness to 
adopt an issue from the media agenda, i.e. (a) issue salience on the media agenda and (b) issue ownership on 
side of the political parties. These can be nicely tied to literature on (a) context effects on parties’ strategic 
communication behaviour and (b) parties’ selective emphasis on strategically advantageous issues (for a 
summary see Adam and Maier, 2016). The first factor builds on the assumption that for the party it is only 
worth to deal with issues that reach a certain visibility in the media. Van der Pas (2014) could show the 
relevance of this salience threshold for EU issues and Swedish parties but not for the Netherlands. The second 
factor refers to parties’ own stance regarding issues and their choice to selectively attach salience to issues in 
their public communication that are advantageous to their own party, e.g. because the party is judged as 
competent to solve the respective problems (e.g. Green-Pedersen, 2007). Several studies have shown that in 
general parties have a higher probability to pick up an issue from the media agenda, which they own 
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themselves (e.g. Green-Pedersen and Stubager 2010; Vliegenthart et al., 2011) but also with regards to EU 
integration (Van der Pas, 2014). Based on this state of research, we pose the following alternative hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2a: Parties will be more likely to pick up issues highly visible in the media (media visibility 
thesis). 
Hypothesis 2b: Parties will be more likely to pick up issues from the media agenda, which they own (issue 
ownership thesis). 
 
Agenda dynamics II – Under which conditions do media react to the party agenda? 
So far, we have tackled the question under which circumstances political parties hook up to the media agenda. 
The other perspective is when do media pick up issues from the parties’ agendas? Research points to the 
following possibilities: First, several authors have shown that opposition parties’ communication might be 
more likely to attract media attention as it usually fits more criteria of newsworthiness (e.g. negativity, attack 
frames; e.g. Thesen, 2013) than the communication of government parties. Another aspect feeding into this 
argument could be that research has shown that it is easiest for parties that are furthest away from 
governmental responsibility to put new issues on the agenda (e.g. Ellinas, 2010; Hobolt and De Vries, 2015), 
which could also add to the newsworthiness of their messages. In addition, Hopmann et al. (2012: 177) 
assume that especially in campaign times, journalists seek to achieve a ‘politically balanced news coverage by 
including candidates from different parties in their news reports’. On the other side, authors have shown that 
media orient themselves towards the political mainstream (e.g. Bennett, 1990) and that incumbent parties 
‘experience a bonus in terms of media attention’ (Hopmann et al., 2012: 176; also see Meijers & Rauh, 2016). 
In addition, media vary in their openness towards specific political actors, preferring mainstream in contrast to 
radical parties on the fringes of the political spectrum (Ellinas, 2010). This should work to the advantage of 
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mainstream and governing parties and make the access to the media agenda difficult especially for radical 
parties. We therefore pose the research question:  
Research Question1: Which parties are more successful in triggering media reactions (in the sense that 
media pick up party issues)?  
 
 
Design and data 
We study the interplay between media and political parties by following and systematising their sequences of 
interactions, i.e. actions and reactions. Empirically, this analysis is based on a temporal-pattern analysis of 
disaggregated data of media publications and party communication (regarding this research desiderate see 
Van Noije et al., 2008). T-pattern analysis allows taking into account multiple interactions between media and 
political parties as the discourse about a specific topic evolves. In this way, we explicitly acknowledge the 
reciprocal character of media-party interactions as requested, e.g. by Van Aelst and Walgrave (2011). Such 
analysis requires the collection of process-oriented data in short intervals, i.e. day to day, and for a longer 
period of observation in order to be able to detect and systematise typical patterns. Therefore, we chose the 12 
weeks prior to the European Parliamentary elections 2014 as period of observation.  
 
Table 1. Criteria for the selection of countries. 
 Austria Germany United Kingdom 
Communicative activity  
of partiesa 
936 301 223 
Radical ideologies  
of partiesb 
FPÖ: 8.7 
(Eurosceptic) 
Linke: 1.2 
(Eurosceptic) 
AfD: 8.9  
(Eurosceptic) 
Greens: 1.9 
(Europhile) 
UKIP: 9.1 
(Eurosceptic) 
BNP: 9.9 
(Eurosceptic) 
a: Number of EU-related press releases of all parties with minimum 3%-vote share; 12 weeks prior to the  
2014 EP elections. Own data. 
b: Range left-right: 0-10. We define a party as radical if its left-right position is located between 0 and 2  
Author 
or between 8 and 10. Party’s position towards EU integration: scale 1-7. We define a party as Eurosceptic between 1 and 3 
and as Europhile between 5 and 7 (both Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014). 
 
The analysis includes media-party interactions in Austria, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Besides the 
goal to generalise findings, variance regarding two criteria has led to this selection of countries (see Table 1): 
First, probability of interactions between media and political parties depends on parties’ general level of 
publication activities (Hopmann et al., 2012), which varies considerably between the three countries. 
Regarding the publication of EU-related press releases, Austrian parties are most active (also due to the 
traditionally high relevance of party press releases in election campaigns in Austria, see below), followed by 
German parties, while British parties publish the fewest EU-related press releases. Second, our research 
question refers to the aspect whether radical parties are ignored as agenda setters due to perceived political 
(in-) correctness. For this reason, parties with radical ideologies were identified. Since we define a party as 
radical if its left-right position is located between 0 and 2 or between 8 and 10 according to the Chapel Hill 
Expert Survey (2014), the most radical parties are located in the United Kingdom, followed by Germany, and 
Austria.  
In order to identify parties that own specific issues (hypothesis 2b), we rely on representative national surveys 
(Kritzinger et al., 2014; Rattinger et al., 2014; Whiteley and Sanders, 2014) in which respondents named the 
most important problems and the parties able to solve the problems best. We define a party as issue owner if it 
is named most often and if the distance to the second party is greater than 10% points (Holian, 2004). If two 
or more parties are dominant in an issue field, issue ownership is regarded as shared.  
 
Content analyses of media and party communication 
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On side of the media, the strongest agenda-setting effects have been shown for newspapers (Van der Pas, 
2014). Therefore, we analysed the news reports in two leading quality newspapers per country, choosing one 
left- and one right-leaning newspaper each in order to control for potential partisan biases. We collected the 
left- and the right-leaning paper rotating on a daily basis and included the following newspapers: for Austria 
Der Standard and Die Presse, for Germany the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
and for the United Kingdom The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph. We coded the complete political/news 
section and the editorial section (including opinion and comments).  
To study parties’ communication several data sources have been taken into account in agenda-setting research 
(e.g. parliamentary questioning, manifestos, campaign ads etc.). All these data sources have their strengths but 
also their shortcomings (Hopmann et al., 2012; Netjes and Binnema, 2007). In order to analyse the sequences 
of media-party interactions in detail, parties’ press releases seem the most adequate form of parties’ 
communication for four reasons: First, press releases are specifically geared towards the media and therefore 
adequate for analysing party-media-interactions (Froehlich & Rüdiger, 2006). Second, press releases can be 
published independently from fixed schedules (different than, e.g. parliamentary questionings) and other 
external factors and also much more flexibly than campaign ads and manifestos. It’s solely a party’s strategic 
decision to launch a press release either actively pushing a specific issue or in reaction to events (e.g. media 
publications or activities of other parties). Third, researchers have argued that due to limited resources and 
time pressure journalists rely on routines and easily accessible information such as press releases (e.g. 
Hopmann, 2012). And fourth, the legal conditions for party communication are very different in the three 
countries. While in Germany and the United Kingdom, televised ads have a high relevance, parties in Austria 
face restrictions here and have to rely stronger on press releases and newspapers ads (the last being less 
common in Germany and the United Kingdom though; e.g. Dolezal et al., 2014). For these reasons, we choose 
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to base our analysis on press releases and take into account all press releases the national parties published 12 
weeks prior to the 2014 European Parliamentary elections (see web appendix).  
As we are interested in agenda-setting regarding European issues, only press releases and media reports that 
referred to European policies, European institutions, European politicians, and/or the European 
Parliamentary elections at least twice were included in the analysis. To identify relevant items, we compiled 
an electronic search string that contained relevant key words and word components (see web appendix). This 
search resulted in a total of 301 relevant press releases for Germany, 936 items for Austria, and 223 press 
releases for the United Kingdom. For Austria 439 newspaper reports were selected, 445 for Germany, and 245 
for the United Kingdom.  
We conducted a quantitative content analysis of the news items and press releases with.the focus on main 
issues. In the case of party communication, only one main issue per press release was counted, however, in 
media reports up to three main issues were coded. We compiled an issue list containing 16 main issue topics 
(and 149 subtopics) that follows the PIREDEU (2009) issue catalogue (for details regarding the coding 
procedure see codebook in the web appendix). To ensure the reliability of coding, all coders participated in a 
comprehensive training programme, followed by a (researcher-coder) reliability test of 15 media reports and 
25 press releases each. We tested for reliability of coding using Krippendorff’s Alpha coefficient. Reliability 
tests delivered satisfactory results for both, press releases and media, with average results for formal 
categories (e.g. date of publishing, source, country, etc.) of Krippendorff’s Alpha = 0.79 – 1.00 and 0.76 – 
1.00 for content characteristics (e.g. main issue) across the three countries. 
 
Analysis of sequential media-party interactions 
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In analysing media-party interactions, our approach is based on the assumptions that parties’ communication 
behaviour is strategic in the sense that they will try to optimise their image and their election result. Such 
strategic behaviours have been shown to produce patterns of repeated behaviour (Mintzberg, 1978). For the 
media, we also expect to observe patterns in publication decisions as they follow certain routines (e.g. 
Shoemaker, Vos and Reese, 2009). Based on these assumptions, we try to detect recurring patterns in media-
party communication by means of T-pattern analysis. T-pattern analysis (Magnusson, 2000) is a method to 
expose recurring structures in a stream of decisions with a special focus on interactions. Initially, it has been 
developed to investigate patterns in human (and animal) behaviour, for example, tactical moves in soccer (e.g. 
Borrie et al., 2002) or interactions with pets (for an overview see Casarrubea et al., 2015). Schwab and Unz 
(2008) have introduced T-pattern analysis to communication research as a way to describe patterns in media 
usage. Unlike other statistical methods that are widely used to examine longitudinal data, T-pattern-analysis is 
not based on the generalised linear model (GLM) and thereby better geared towards untangling complex and 
non-linear social processes. Additionally, T-pattern-analysis is based on non-aggregated data. Therefore, it is 
able to detect interactions that take place in short time intervals typical for media’s issue attention and also for 
political parties’ reactions (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). 
A typical dataset for T-pattern analysis contains several events that occur repeatedly during a certain period of 
time, e.g. party A publishes a press release regarding tax policy. The so-called ‘critical interval detection 
algorithm’ searches for an event B (e.g. a newspaper article on tax policy) that occurs after event A within a 
critical time interval more frequently than simply by random chance. The algorithm begins by testing wider 
intervals so that a large number of AB-Patterns is found; the intervals being so wide, it is not likely that the 
frequency of B is significantly higher than its basic rate. The algorithm then gradually narrows and tests 
smaller intervals until significance is reached or less than x (usually three) patterns can be found. In a next 
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step, this simple AB-pattern is combined with other events or patterns to more complex structures. The lower 
critical distance between event A and B can (theoretically) be minimised to Event A + d1 t = 0. Also, the 
number of minimal occurrences required for a sequence to be considered a pattern can (theoretically) be set to 
any number >1. 
We conducted the T-pattern analysis using the software Theme 5.0 (Magnusson, 2004), running separate 
analyses for the three countries and for the three most important topics in each country (see Table A1 in the 
web appendix). The dataset was structured in half-day steps, assuming that newspaper articles (as reactions to 
press releases published on earlier days) could only be published in the morning, but that press releases (as 
reactions to newspaper articles) could also be issued during the same day. Setting the minimum number of 
occurrences per pattern to three and α = .05, Theme found 104 patterns of media-party interactions (for an 
illustrative sample see web appendix). 
To examine whether the patterns found are plausible, we drew a random sample of minimum 10% of the 
patterns found for every country and every topic. These patterns were verified based on a manual coding of 
the original publications. A pattern was considered plausible when at least 50% of publications automatically 
identified as following an initial publication and therefore assigned to a pattern cited the first publication in 
the pattern explicitly or referred to the same social discourse as the first pattern. Our first results suggested 
that most of the patterns found with T-pattern analysis were plausible with the exception of the issue economy. 
Economy as a broad category in our codebook included a wide range of specific topics. For this reason, we 
split economy into three sub-issues: economy 1 (economic policy, bank and financial sector regulation), 
economy 2 (trade policy) and economy 3 (state budget and debts). As economy 3 in the end still turned out to 
be too broad and not suitable for our purposes, we removed this category from our further analyses. The 
plausibility values of the found patterns are presented in Table A2 in the web appendix to this paper. In sum, 
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between 72 and 86% of the checked patterns found with T-pattern analysis contained plausible interactions of 
media and parties in the sense of explicitly citing each other or referring to the same issue. 
In most of the papers that use T-pattern analysis a small number of interesting patterns is selected and 
analysed descriptively (see Casarrubea et al., 2015). In the following, we go one step further and systematise 
and describe the patterns quantitatively on an aggregated level according to our research question and 
hypotheses. 
 
Findings 
Who sets the agenda?  
Through T-pattern analyses, we can see not only how often media and parties referred to European issues 
during the 2014 election campaign but also find out how often they were successful in initiating a discourse 
regarding this issue. We regard the agenda-setting as successful if the issue is also picked up by other players.  
Table 2. Successful agenda-setting by media and political parties. 
Austria, top 3 issues: international affairs, social and labour market, economy 
 ÖVP SPÖ Greens FPÖ NEOS BZÖ Parties Standard Die Presse Media 
publicationsa 28 44 31 23 3 15 144 28 34 62 
t-patternsb 19 20 12 9 0 5 65 
(45%) 
12 22 34 
(55%) 
 
Germany, top 3 issues: international affairs, law and order, economy 
 CDU SPD FDP Greens Linke AfD Parties SZ FAZ Media 
publicationsa 10 22 9 18 27 7 93 34 30 64 
t-patternsb 3 0 0 6 10 0 19 
(20%) 
12 13 25 
(39%) 
 
United Kingdom, top 3 issues: international affairs, territorial questions, immigration 
 Conser-
vatives 
Labour 
 
Liberal 
Democrats 
Greens 
 
UKIP 
 
BNP 
 
Parties 
 
Guardian 
 
Daily 
Telegraph 
Media 
 
publicationsa 3 14 17 4 17 28 83 35 22 57 
t-patternsb 0 4 6 0 0 10 20 
(25%) 
20 15 35 
(61%) 
a: number of published press releases/newspaper articles. 
Author 
b: number of press releases/newspaper articles that start T-patterns. 
 
Table 2 presents the number of publications by media and political parties referring to the three most 
important issues during the 2014 election campaigns in each country. For Austria, the six political parties 
included in the study issued a total of 144 press releases during 12 weeks regarding the three most important 
issues (i.e. international affairs, social and labour market and economy1+2), whereas the two leading media 
outlets published 62 reports. While the number of publications is comparable for both newspapers, the SPÖ 
published about twice as many press releases than the other parties, with NEOS and BZÖ being rather 
inactive.1 In sum, 45% of the parties’ publications start a T-pattern, i.e. lead to follow-up publications by 
media or other parties. Austrian media are even more successful in setting the agenda with 55% of their 
reports being followed by other publications. 
In Germany, the top three issues during the 2014 EP campaign were international affairs (rank 1) and 
economy1+2 (rank 3) as in Austria and law and order (rank 2). Here, the six parties issued only 93 press 
releases, while the media published about the same number of reports as in Austria (i.e. 64). The high number 
of press releases published by the Linke is especially striking. However, in Germany only 20% of party 
publications are picked up by other actors. This success rate is higher for the media (39%), but also lower than 
in Austria. 
In the United Kingdom, international affairs also was the most important issue during the campaign, however, 
territorial questions (i.e. EU-exit) and immigration rank second and third. Similar to Germany, the six parties 
launched 83 press releases, including a strikingly high number of press releases from the BNP and the two 
newspapers published 57 reports. With 25% of press releases being referred to in following publications, in                                                         
1 The fact that mainstream parties in Austria and Germany did not publish less EU-related press releases than 
challenger parties illustrates our argument leading to Hypothesis 1b. Only in the UK, the BNP (but not Greens 
or UKIP) was more active than the mainstream parties.   
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the United Kingdom parties start public discourses about as often as in Germany; however, 61% of the media 
reports are followed by other publications, making this the highest success rate in all three countries. 
In sum, it can be stated that most public discourses detected during the 2014 EP election campaigns by means 
of T-pattern analysis in all three countries are started by media publications, thus rather supporting 
Hypothesis 1a than Hypothesis 1b. Especially in the United Kingdom and also in Austria, the majority of 
newspaper reports are followed by other publications. Political parties in Austria are also quite successful at 
initiating discussions about EU issues; however, their communicative efforts using press releases are 
traditionally much more intensive than in Germany and the United Kingdom.  
 
Under which conditions do parties react to the media? 
The next question is under which circumstances political parties pick up EU-related issues from the media 
agenda. Hypothesis 2a claims that an issue’s visibility in the media determines parties’ attention, whereas 
Hypothesis 2b assumes that parties only hook up to issues which they own themselves. Table 3 shows to how 
many discourses started by media political parties respond implicitly by referring to the same issue or even 
explicitly by quoting the newspaper. For Austria, we find that the issue that receives the most attention in 
newspaper articles is international affairs (n = 29). Altogether, 12 press releases pick up this issue. However, 
social and labour market, which ranks only second in the media (n = 16), is picked up in 19 press releases, 
while both economic topics are reported by the media eight respectively nine times and picked up by parties 
only three times. In Germany, however, we find a different picture. Here, only the topic which receives the 
most media attention (i.e. international affairs, n = 33) is picked up in following press releases  
 
Table 3. Issues picked up by political parties. 
Austria, top 3 issues: international affairs, social and labour market, economy 
 Ia sola eco1 eco2 
Author 
# newspaper articles 29 16 8 9 
# press releases 36 44 24 40 
# press releases contained in T-patterns started by articles 
 12 19 0 3 
# press releases contained in T-patterns started by media or other parties  
… ÖVP   0 6 0 7 
… SPÖ  4 16 5 4 
… Greens  7 5 0 6 
… FPÖ 5 4 0 7 
… NEOS  0 0 0 0 
… BZÖ  3 3 0 0 
Grey: issue owners; Source: Kritzinger et al. (2014); ia: international affairs; sola: social and labour market; eco: economy. 
 
Germany, top 3 issues: international affairs, law and order, economy 
 ia lo eco1 eco2 
# newspaper articles 33 17 6 8 
# press releases 38 16 23 16 
# press releases contained in T-patterns started by articles 
 26 0 0 0 
# press releases contained in T-patterns started by media or other parties 
… CDU  4 0 0 3 
… SPD  8 0 0 0 
… FDP  3 0 0 0 
… Greens  0 0 0 0 
… Linke  13 0 0 0 
… AfD  0 0 - 0 
Grey: issue owners; Source: Rattinger et al. (2014); ia: international affairs; lo: law and order; eco: economy. 
 
United Kingdom, top 3 issues: international affairs, territorial questions, immigration 
 tq Ia im 
# newspaper articles 27 19 11 
# of press releases 40 23 20 
# press releases contained in T-patterns started by articles 
 17 4 11 
# press releases contained in T-patterns started by media or other parties 
… Conservatives  0 0 0 
… Labour  3 4 4 
… Liberal Democrats  10 0 0 
… Greens  0 0 0 
… UKIP  6 0 3 
… BNP  3 0 7 
Grey: issue owners; Source: Whiteley and Sanders (2014) 
Issues: tq: territorial questions;  ia: international affairs; im: immigration. 
 
of the parties (n = 26); media reports dealing with the topics law and order (n = 17) or economy (n = 6; n = 8) 
are totally disregarded by the political parties. In the United Kingdom, the picture looks a bit different again, 
where the top media topic (i.e. territorial questions; n = 27) is picked up 17 times by parties, but the second 
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important topic (i.e. international affairs; n = 19) only four times; in contrast, the third media topic 
immigration (n = 11) is referred to in 11 party publications. 
Based on these findings, support for Hypothesis 2a is at best mixed: It seems true that important media topics 
usually get picked up by the parties; however, this correlation does not seem linear in the sense that media 
visibility clearly predicts parties’ reactions. 
Looking at the reactions of parties who own the topics brought up by the media or other parties (i.e. issue 
owners, marked in grey in Table 3) also leaves us with mixed results. In Austria, the SPÖ picks up all media 
topics for which the party is regarded an issue owner and for social and labour market issues clearly marking 
its issue ownership with by far the highest number of press releases following respective publications of other 
actors (n = 16). However, the ÖVP, which owns most of the issues together with the SPÖ, does not respond to 
all these issues; whereas, the other parties do not hesitate to respond to publications on issues that they do not 
own themselves. In Germany, the governing CDU, which owns all four issues, does not take the chance of its 
issue ownerships. In the United Kingdom it is interesting to see that the most engagement in the discussion of 
territorial questions comes from the Liberal Democrats, who do not own this issue either. Taken together, 
Hypothesis 2b must be rejected. 
 
To which parties do media react? 
Turning to the question to which parties’ agenda-setting media respond, we have posed the open research 
question whether media react more often to government parties’ communication (government bonus) or to 
opposition parties’ communication (mediatisation of opposition), or whether they react more often to 
opposition parties but disregard radical parties (political correctness). Our findings regarding these questions 
are summarised in Table 4. For Austria, it seems that the governing SPÖ, that publishes by far the most press 
Author 
releases, indeed is most successful in starting discourses also picked up by the media in the field of social and 
labour market, where they also publish the most press releases. Media attention to the national coalition 
partner ÖVP is lower and not higher than for some opposition parties (i.e. Greens and FPÖ). Contrary to the 
assumption that radical parties might be neglected by the media, FPÖ receives some media attention in the 
field of international affairs.  
In Germany, we find a quite similar picture. The governing CDU is quite efficient with its statements 
regarding international affairs. However, the coalition partner SPD is not able to stimulate discussions in the 
media, while the opposition (Greens) and even radical parties (Linke) receive attention for their press releases. 
In the United Kingdom, the picture is more or less the same: Here the Liberal Democrats are successful with 
their engagement regarding territorial questions, but the opposition (Labour) and the radical BNP also are 
referred to in the media. 
In sum, our findings do not support the assumption that only incumbent national parties are successful in 
shaping the media agenda; it also does not seem to be true that parties with radical positions are neglected by 
the media.
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Table 4. Party issues picked up by the media. 
Austria, top 3 issues: international affairs, social and labour market, economy             
Party ÖVP (gov) SPÖ (gov/chancellor) Greens (chall) FPÖ (mop/rad) NEOS (chall) BZÖ (chall) 
Issue 
 ia sola 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 Ia sola 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 ia sola 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 ia sola 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 ia sola 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 ia sola 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 
# press releases 
 4 6 6 12 9 22 8 5 8 7 3 13 9 4 2 8 2 0 0 1 4 5 5 1 
# press releases picked up by newspapers 
  4 
(67%) 
   14  
(64%) 
   3 
(43%) 
  3 
(33%) 
           
 
Germany, top 3 issues: international affairs, law and order, economy             
Party CDU (gov/chancellor) SPD (gov) FPD (mop) Greens (mop) Linke (chall/rad) AfD (chall/rad) 
Issue 
 ia lo 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 Ia lo 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 ia lo 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 Ia lo 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 ia lo 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 ia lo 
eco 
1 
eco 
2 
# press releases 
 4 2 2 2 9 3 6 4 4 3 1 1 4 6 4 4 15 2 5 5 2 0 5 0 
# press releases picked up by newspapers 
 3 
(75%) 
            3 
(50%) 
  10 
(67%) 
       
 
United Kingdom, top 3 issues: international affairs, territorial questions, immigration             
Party Conservatives 
(gov/primeminister) 
Labour (mop) 
 
LibDems (gov) Greens (chall/rad) UKIP (chall/rad) BNP (chall/rad) 
 
Issue ia tq im ia tq im ia tq im ia tq im ia tq im ia tq im 
# press releases 
 1 1 1 5 5 4 2 15 0 0 2 2 2 10 5 13 7 8 
# press releases picked up by newspapers 
     4 
(80%) 
  6 
(40%) 
       4 
(31%) 
3 
(43%) 
 
Party groups: gov: mainstream government party; mop: mainstream opposition party; chall: challenger party; rad.: radical party;  
Issues: ia: international affairs; sola: social and labour market; eco: economy; lo: law and order; tq: territorial questions; im: immigration.
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Summary and conclusion  
In this paper, we have analysed the interactions between media and political parties in Austria, Germany and 
the United Kingdom when putting EU-related issues on the agenda during the campaigns before the 2014 
European Parliamentary elections using T-pattern analysis. This approach provides us with the opportunity to 
take into account individual actions of all players and their communicative reactions to each another (for a 
similar idea see Thesen, 2013), significantly expanding the state of agenda-setting research with regards to its 
dynamic perspective. We first found that most public discourses were started by media publications, 
supporting the hypothesis that media and not political parties – even in campaign times – are the more 
important agenda-setters regarding European topics in all three countries. Political parties in Austria were also 
quite successful in initiating discussions about EU issues; however, their communicative efforts using press 
releases are traditionally much more intensive than in Germany and the United Kingdom. Regarding the 
conditions under which public discourse flourishes, our findings are mixed. First, for the question which 
media topics get picked up by the political parties, it seems true that important media topics usually also 
trigger reactions of the political parties. However, this correlation does not seem linear in the sense that the 
more visible topics are in the media, the more attention they also get from the parties. At the same time, issue 
ownership does not seem to be a reliable predictor either for the parties’ engagement in the public debate. 
Finally, regarding the question which parties’ communication efforts get attention by the media, we found that 
not only incumbent national parties are successful in shaping the media agenda, but also opposition and even 
radical parties can stimulate public discourse. Not in all but in some cases it seems that the engagement that 
parties show independent from issue ownership pays off. So, the take-home message of our paper is that 
media in general are the most relevant agenda-setters also with regards to EU-issues. However, all party 
groups have the potential to also shape the public discourse. It almost seems that on issues, which parties 
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engage with during the campaign, a real interplay takes place between media and parties, with parties reacting 
to the media agenda and the media taking into account parties’ statements. This finding is in line with Thesen 
(2013) and Van Aelst and Walgrave (2011) who argue that neither media nor politics dominate each other but 
that media logics and political strategies overlap und reinforce each other. 
Methodologically T-pattern analysis has proven to be a valuable tool to detect dynamic interactions among 
parties and media. However, our analysis also reveals that T-pattern analysis requires distinct and clearly 
delimited categories of events (in our case the issue category): Diffuse categories (e.g. the broad issue field 
economy) may lead to fuzzy patterns of events that do not refer to each other.  
Finally, our study leaves open questions for future research. First, our analysis only takes into account the 
interactions between parties and media based on press releases and newspaper items; however, other forms of 
contacts as well as other media channels have to be acknowledged to provide a more complete picture of 
party-media interactions. Second, our analysis so far has been limited to agenda-setting and -dynamics on the 
issue-level. Of course, it is also an important research question how positions and evaluations – consistent or 
contradictory – evolve from these interactions (e.g. Froehlich and Rüdiger, 2006). Last but not least, the 
limited support for our hypotheses and the strong country differences show the necessity to keep party-media 
interactions on top of research agendas as more effort has to be put in understanding agenda dynamics. Future 
research needs to go beyond asking who leads the tango but has to explain how agenda dynamics unfold. To 
do so, we might need incorporate factors internal to the actors involved (cohesion of parties, left-right 
alignment of newspapers), strategic considerations of parties and media (e.g. Thesen, 2013; Van de Wardt et 
al., 2014; Vliegenthart and Montes, 2014),  as well as (changes in) the national contexts (e.g. public opinion 
towards Europe, support for challenger parties). If we study party-media interactions in relation to EU 
Author 
 
integration, we may solve the puzzle of how debates on Europe evolve and under which conditions EU 
integration becomes politicised. 
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